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Security analysts are the major providers and analysts of market information, the 
activities that many security analysts collect and analyze information can improve the 
pricing efficiency of market, and enhance the welfare of all investors. However, the 
security analysts’ behavior of conflict of interests can have passive impact on investors 
and listing companies by various ways, resulting in the distortion of markets price 
mechanism and low level of resource allocation efficiency. Therefore, reinforcing the 
supervision and governance of the security analysts’ conflict of interests, improving the 
objectivity and independence of security research, are not only the necessary measures 
which can protect the interests of vast investors, especially the individual investors who 
are in the inferior position of information, but also the necessary measures which can 
uphold the effective operation of whole security markets and improve the pricing 
efficiency of security markets. 
In this paper, by constructing models we have done some more deeply systematic 
study and analysis of security analysts’ behavior of conflict of interests and governance 
mechanism. On the base of examining our country’s security research in security 
markets’ position and in security companies’ orientation, this paper examines and 
analyzes the security analysts’ general developing situation, various conflict of interests 
and markets manifestation that they confront, and discuss various sources that initiate the 
security analysts’ behavior of conflict of interests and the impact on investors, listing 
companies and asset prices. By constructing models, this paper discusses the relative 
achievement salary and institute investors’ impact on security analysts’ behavior of 
conflict of interests. On the base of doing model analysis to security analysts’ conflict of 
interests, this paper tries to discuss the feasible and effective governance mechanism. 
After the scandal in the Wall Street, the SEC of USA tries to protect and reduce the 
problem of security analysts’ conflict of interests by means of setting “Chinese Wall” in 
the department of investment bank and the department of research in the security 
companies’ inside. So, how these two supervision measures that have been adopted 
extensively by various countries in the world can have impact on the behavior of security 
analysts, is the problem that this paper will discuss focally at last. 
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者将华尔街的著名投资银行及某些“明星分析师”告上法庭。2003 年 4 月份，花
旗集团、美林公司和高盛公司等十家顶级投资机构与美国司法和监管当局达成和解
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截至 2004 年，全国共有证券投资咨询机构 214 家。其中，专营证券投资咨询
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